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INSANITY AS A DFENSE TO CRIMI TIAL ACTS.
StAtutes were framed and principles of law were
laid down regulating the legal relations of the insane
long before physicians had acquired any accurate notions
respecting their malady; and, as might be expected, er-
ror and injustice have been committed to an incalculable
extent under the revered name of law. The actual state
of our knowledge of insanity as well as of other diseas-
es, so far from being what it once was, is now the ac-
cumulated result of observatio' aided and guided more
or less by a deductive philosophy. The world owes a
debt of gratitude to the celebrated Pine], who with an
ardor of philanthropy that no discouragement could
quench, and a courage that no apprehension of danger
could daunt, succeeded, at last, in removing the chains
of the maniac and establishing his claims to all the
liberties and comforts his condition left him capable
of enjoying.
Iii all civilized communiities, ancient or modern,
some forms of insanity have been regarded as exemptin-
from the punishment of crime, and under some circumstanc-
es at least, as vitiatiii, the civil acts of those who
were affected by it. The only difficulty or div' rsity
of opi.ion consists iq ascert-iiriri- who are really in-
sane in the meaning of the law, which has beea content
with merely laying- down some *:elieral priaciples and
leavin- their applicatio i to the discretio of judici.l
a -thorities. The frequency with which insanity is
pl-aded in defense of crime, the magnitude of the con-
sequences to the parties concerned, and the perplei-
ties in which the discussion it occasions involves the
minds of the judges and jurors, are ample re>asons why
the law relative to insanity should be simple and eas-
ily understood, a result that can only be obtained by
direct legislative eaactments. It is time for a le-is-
lature to determine what, amid the mass of coiflictina
opinions on this subject, shall be the law of the laud;
and thus i( longer to permit the lives and liberties of
the people to be suspended on the dicta of men whose
knowledge of insanity is exceedingly imperfect, and
whose decisions have not even the merit of uniformity
and consisteu-cy.
No state or legislative power in the country has
liven anywhere near a lucid and inst Uctive statute on
the subject. It may be well, therefor'e, to s(.re what
hlas beeni the le-izlationa of vario-lis enligihtened uatioit-
in reference to this subject. The -Lnvarian criminal
code contains this passa-e: "IMinors and those 1lborivig
under gener:l mania or halluciiiatiot, cannot be pun-
ished as criminals, nor, generally speakin-, can other's
be puiished who have committed a crime while deprived
of the use of their mind." In the Saxon code we find
the following: "Responsibility is annulled in persons
who are deprived of the use of reason by mental dis-
ease. "
In the study of the English Common Law decisions,
we have too often seen the deplorable failure of such
general terms to protect the miserable subjects of dis-
ease. Iti some of the later Codes an attempt has beea
made to avoid the objection to gerieral terms by mentioti-
in- various mental diseases as illustrations of the
meanin-z intended to be conveyed. In the proposed code
of the &rand Duchy of Yesse, so says Mittermaier, we
find the followinL: "By reason of their impaired res-
ponsibility, punishment cannot be inflicted upon those
who commit penal acts in a state of sleep, of somnam-
bulism, of general mania, general and partial hallucin-
ation, of imbecility or any other mental disorder,
which either takes away all conscio-ostiess r'-,spectin-
the act generally and its relation to the penal law, or
ii conajutnction with some peculiar bodily condiLiori, ir-
rtsistably impells him, completely unconscious, to vi-
olent acts."
In the code of the arand Duchy of Baden, it is
eniacted as follows: "Responsibility is ai-inulled in that
condition in which either consciousness of the crimin-
ality of the offense or the free will of the offender
is takei away. To the condition which annulls respons-
ibility on the strength of the foregoin, act beloa-
chiefly: imbecility, hallucination, general mania, dis-
traction and complete confusion of the senses or under-
standing. "
Because of the difficulties incumbent upon the use
of such terms, and to bring the wretched subjects of
mental disorder under the protection of the law, with-
oiut discrimination, the legislator has in some instances
made the fact of the presence of disease of the mind
sufficient reason to an,,ul criminal responsibility. In
Livin2gston's code it is provided, that no act done by
a person in the state of insanity can be punished as an
o IFf eus e.
The Penal Code of ilinnesota, Sections 19 & 21, pro-
vides that mental unsoundness shall be no ezcuse for
crime, unless it is shown that the act was done while
the defendant was laboring under such defect of reason
as either not to know the natnre and quality of the act,
or that it was wrong, or that a morbid propensity to
commit prohibited acts shall be no excuse for their
commission unless defendant is shown to be incapable of
knowing the wrongfulness of such acts, or an uncontrol-
!able and insane impulse to commit crime, in one who is
conscious of the nature and Auality of the act.
The Revised Statutes of krkansas provides that a
lunatic, or insane person, without lncid intervals,
shall not be founid guilty of any crime or misdemeanor
with which he may be charged.
The criminal code of Germany contains the follow-
ing provision, which is said to have been the formulat-
ed result of very able discussion both by lawyers and
physicians of that country. "There is no criminal lia-
bility when the actor at the time of the offense is in
a state of unconsciousness, or morbid disturbance of
the mind, through which the free determination of his
will does not act."
The French code provides that there can be no
crime or offense if the accused was iii a state of mad-
ness at the time of the act. For some time the French
tribunals were inclined and in fact did interpret this
law in such a manner as to follow the law of England,
but now this construction has been abandoned and the
modern view of the medical profession is now adopted
and followed in that country.
It seems, after a careful examination of the stat-
utes upon the subject and a review of the decisions on
insanity, that a statute like the followini- -ould better
promote the purposes of justice: A person cannot be
punished for a crime conmitted while he is in a state
of idiocy, imbecility, lunacy or insanity or in any
other state of mind in which the person is involuntari-
ly deprived of the consciousness of the true nature of
his acts, or is in such a condition of mind caused by
disease of the mind as not to be able to control his
acts towards others.
It is a general rule, but not without exception,
that insanity once bein- established, responsibility is
taken away; and all nice distinctions concerning the
degree, and the effect of this or that kind of mental
derangement, and the enact measure of reason that has
been left or taken away, are effectually precluded. An
insane person, though it may be argued, may actually be
-uilty of a crimiaal act, the crime not being in the
range of his insanity, while by the letter of such a
law he must be acquitted. To remedy this, add to the
proposed statute the words: ualess it can be proved that
the act was not committed through the influence of dis-
ease.
V It can be easily seen that when our statute mak-
ers came to frame statutes upon the subject of insanity,
they did nothing more, with few exceptions, than to de-
clare the common law itself. The common law had long
held that a man who was insane could not be held res-
ponsible for his acts. As long ago as in the reign of
Fenry the Eighth, the year book published in the twenty-
first year of his reign tells us that a man was ar-
raigned for the murder of a child, and that upon the
trial it was found that he was insane, and upon these
facts it was determined that he should go free quod
nota bone etc., but it goes no further than to say that
he should not be found guilty; it does not give any in-
formation of the test by which the question of his in-
sanity is to be determined, nor of the evidence requir-
ed necessary to establish it.
The formulation of the common law into statutes
did nothinc- more thai, to briiner the subject before the
notice of the people rid to place it ill a position that
it mi-ht not be ,ainsaid.
This much for statutory law on the subject of in-
sanity. 7!o statute to my knowledge has defined the
term insanity. They have done little more thain to in-
timate some of the obvious divisions. In the Roman Law
the insane, or dementes, are divided into two classes:
those whose understanding is weak or dull, menti copti
and those who are restless and furious, furiotu-s. The
French and Prussian codes make use of the terndemence,
fureur and imbecilite, without attemptijg to define
them.
The En-!ish Common Law originally reconized two
kinds of insanity: idiocy and lunacy, the subjects of
which were designated by the terms non compos mentis,
which was used in a -eneric sense, and meant to embrace
all who, from defect of the understaniding, required the
protection of the law. Occasionally a jurist will at-
tempt to define and point out the persons afflicted
with various kinds atid degrees of insanity. Lord Coke
says, "There are four kinds of men who may be said to
be non compos ment~s: - First, an idiot, who from his
nativity, by a perpetual infirmity is non compos; S c-
ond, anyone that by sickness, grief or accident wholly
loseth his memory and understandin. ; Third, ,L lunatic,
who has sometimes 1.uderstandin- and sometimes not, ale-
quando gaudet lucides iintervall-s, and therefore is
called non compos mentis so long as h has not under-
stLzidili: iourth, he that by his own vicious act for
a tim1 depriveth himself of his memory and understnad-
ing, as he that is drunkent."
Blackstone's understnadin- of the term insane
person is one whose mind is affected by general imbecil-
ity, or is subject to one or more specific delusions;
and of the term lunatic, one who hath had understanding,
but by disease, grief or other accident, hath lost the
use of his memory and reason. kn idiot is one who
had no utiderstandin- from his nativity.
The first attempt to point out precisely those
conditions of insanity in which the civil and criminal
responsibilities are uiiequally affected was made by
Lord ~ale, 1 H. P. C. page 290. "There is a partial
insanity," says he, "and a total insanity. The former
is either in respect to thiiigs quod hoc illud insanare.
Some persons that have a competent use of reason in res-
pect to some particular discourses, subjects or appli-
cations, or els J it is partial iiL respect to dezrees;
and this is the condition of very many, especially mel-
ancholy persons, who for the most part display their
defect in excessive fears and griefs and yet are not
wholly destitute of the use of reason* and the partial
insanity seems not to excuse them in the committing of
any offense in matters capital, for doubtless most per-
sons that are felons of themselves, and others, are
under a degree of partial insanity when they commit
those offenses. It is very difficult to defilie the
visible line that divides perfect and partial iisanity.
But it must rest upon circumstances to be weighed and
considered both by judge and jury, lest on the one hand
there be a kind of inhumanity toward the defects of hu-
man nature, or on the other hand too great an indulgence
given to great crimes." So stroag was the celebrated
jurist possessed that it is the strength and capacity
of the mind that are affected by insanity, that he act-
ually founded upon it a test for criminal rm2sponsibility.
"Such a person," says he, "as laboring under melancholy
distemper, hath yet ordiinarily as great understandin::-
as a child of fourteen years hath, is such a person as
may be guilty of felony or treason."
By this rule Lord Fale makes the only difference
between total and partial insanity precisely that which
is made by differeaces of a-e, as if there could not be
two thin -:s more alikl, than the mind of a person labor-
in-n unde3r melancholy distemper and that of a child
fourteen years old.
The doctriie thus domatically laid downi by Lord
Hale has exerted no inconsiderable influ-nce on th ju-
dicial opinions of his successors; and his high a_-tthor-
ity has often been i.voked against the plea of insan-
ity whenever it has been ,-r-,d by the voice of philan-
thropy and true science. I consequnce of the comn,.on
indul 'erce in foi'cin- an unwarrantable construction
wheiever a point is to be gained, his principles have
been made to meain far more than ever by him desi-jued.
The fact teaches us the importance of clear aUd well
defined terms in the expression of scientific truths,
as well as of enlarged information relative to the sub-
ject to which they belon-. Iii the time of this eminent
jurist, insanity was a much less prevalent disease than
it is now, and the popular opinions concernin- it were
derived from observations of the wretched inmates of
the madhouse, whom chains and stripes, cold and filth,
had reduced to the stupidity of ati idiot, or exasper-
ated to the fury of a demon.
Until quite recently the course of practice in
the Ei-.lish criminal courts has been in strict conform-
ity to th, principles laid Jown by Lord al ,: that
partial insan-ity is no excuse for the commission of an
i!Is ;al act. In the trial of rnold, 16 Fow., St. Tr.
pao~e 763, decided in 1783, for shootin. Onslo, , L.
Justic.e Tracy observed, "It is not every kiud of fran-
tic humor, or something unaccountable in a man's ac-
tions that points him out to be such a mad-maii, as ey-
emptin-2 him Prom pI. Liishme it; it must be a man that is
totally deprived of understanding and memory and does
not know what he is doin., no more than an infant, a
brute or a wild beast; such a person is never the ob-
ject of punuishment."
This is but the echo of Lord Hale's doctrine and
the circumstances of the case % how faithfully these
priaciples were applied, but with more vigor, perhaps,
than the Lord would apply them had he been the presid-
ing jud-e. In 1812 in the trial of Bellin-ham, ttor-
ney &ibbs said,"A man may be deranLged in iiind - his in-
tellect may be insufficient for enabling him to coniduct
the common affairs of lif3, such as disposing of his
property, as judgi!i, of, the claims which his respective
relations have uponi him, and if he be so, the adminis-
tration of the county will take his affairs in band and
appoint trust,-es: but at thee sam: time such a mia is
not dischar ed for his criminal acts."
Lord Erskine had previously 'iven the same doc-
trine the sa ,tctioii of his tUthority in his celebrat d
speech in defense of Urtfi ,-d, 27 flow. , St. Tr. , 1182,
"I am bound," he says, "to admit there is a widi dis-
tinction between civil and criminal cases. If in the
former a man appears upon the evid,ice to be non compos
me atis, the law avoids his acts thou-h it camenot be
traced or connected with the morbid ima-ination which
?o-stitutes his disease, which may be e t~nsively par-
tial in the influence upon his conduct; but to d,liver
a man from responsibility from crimes, above all for
crimes of great atrocity and wickedness, I am by no
means prepared to apply this rule however well estab-
lished, when property is aot concerned."
That a person whom the law prevents from managing
his own property by reason of his mental impairment
should in respect to criminal acts be considered as
possessing all the re uirements of responsibility, and
placed on the same footilg as men of the strongest
minds, is a proposition so strange and startling that
few, uninfluenced by professional bias, can yield to
it unhesitating assent or look upon it in any other*
light than as >elo~igi~pr to that cluss of doctrines which
may be the perfectioni of r aso1 to the initiated, but
which appear to b, the hei :ht of absurdity to everyone
else.
The modern acceptationi of the term non compos
nm~ts is its use in a eneric sense, includiing. both
idiocy and lunacy. They both had in the early Eniglish
and kmerican cases a more restricted meaning than they
have at present, and were held to impart a total depriv-
ation of seanse, and not to include mere imbecility and
weakness of mind. In modern cases they are held not
only to include idiocy and lunacy as strictly defined
by common law, but all cases of imbecility where the
subject is incapable of conductinl the ordinary affairs
of life and liable to become the victim of his own
weakness.
An illustration of the modern acceptance of the
term insanity is brougxht out in the case of Loefles vs.
State, 10 Ohio St., 598. Justice Swan said, "Insanity
inde,--d ezists in so many shapes and forms, has so many
varied insi ,nia and manifestations, that it is almost
impossible for science to comprehend it or -ive it iN-
telli-ible definitions. The learned and the unlearned
differ about it; what is insanity to one is not to an-
other. The classes, species and modific tioiis arnv Inot
well ,ud,-rstood by any of us, learned or otherwise. It
seems ijde ,d as indefinite in extent as the mind its If."
Put return to the subject, the kmerican and En£-
lish Encyclopedia says, "that idiocy consists ina a
d~ficieny of the mental f-acolties, either con;enital
or the result of arrestd development durig infancy; it
is ca sterility of the mind -and not a perversion of the
n.iderstanidin-. An idiot is a person without understand-
in-- and one who is !ea:-lly presumeJ Liever to have had
-ay, as where a person cannot count twenty or tell his
name or age. An idiot is considered at law incapable
of conmitting a crime: and where idiocy e1 ists in rf-
erence to the particular act, the court will direct an
acquittal." 4 person born deaf an, dumb but not blind,
is not considred an idiot, yet the want of hearinE may
e'ist in coniection with responsibility for crime, and
if such person is shown to be able to comprehend the
nature of his acts he may be convicted, but such per-
sons as are born beaf, dumb and blind are presamed to
be idiots and not capable of coniitting crime; yet the
presumption may be rebutted. But in the case of deaf
mutes malice caninot be implied." So much for idiots etc.
Upou 'ii examination of the eacly English cases
ofi ins,-inity, after the theory thift a p--rson had to b.,
so insan-, in order to be exempted from his criminal acts,
that he did not have atiy more r,' aon than a- wild beast,
an infant or an idiot, had partly iploded, it sems
that the test for determinin- who was really insane
within the meanin: of the law, was based upon the the-
ory that a person in order to be protected for his
criminal acts, must be so affected by disease of the
mind as not to know that the particular act he was com-
mit' ii was wrong '. ,Je first find the right and wrong
test set forth and followed in the case of Edward Ar-
nold, 16 Fow. St. Tr. 766, in which it was said: "If
the defendant was under the visitation of God, and
could not know what he did, though he committed the
reatest offense, ye2t he could not be guilty of any of-
fease acainst the law, but if he did know what he did
and that it was wrong, he is not within the e1 emption
of the law." The cases that followed this reco-.iized
it with few exceptions; the case of John Hartfield,
27 How. St. Tr. 1282, is a notable exception. Il this
case the defen(lant was arraigned for shooting at the
king and was acquitted upon the grounds that he was un-
der an insane delusion, that G od had directed him to
shoot the kiL<.
The rustion which presents itslf upo1 an exam-
ination of the early c'ises is why should the courts
at that early adopt the knowledge of ri :ht Ld wrong
as the test for det~rmini ig who are really responsible
for their criminal acts. This I <aI test, as adopt-
ed by the courts, was base d upon the prevailing medical
theory of that ax,. The physicians had never heard
of insanity in the form of an insane deltsion or ati
irrisistible impulsa to do a certain act by which the
person affected cannot control his will power, although
he may know the act he is doin- is wrong, but the courts
havin- no other guide for a basis, accepted the medi-
cal theory of that early day, and with few exceptioiis
have continued to follow it until the present day, and
hav many times refused to adopt th. more mod36rn theo-
ries of the physiciaLns a nd some courts as to the true
test of one's responisibility for criminal acts when
affected with insanity, which true science and ad-
va;i3cd civilizatio.n calls for.
The question of whether the courts of En land wre
to recognize any other form of insanity than that which
was accepted by them and founded upon theories of the
physicians, advancsd a hundred years befor, came up in
the IVJcaughte case, 10 6. L F. 200, Upon the trial
ei'2ht eAperts "- ve their opiiions going to show that th
dJfendant had committed the act in rIujstioji und r the
iJflueaice of a morbid delusion, which d.zprived him of
the powder of self control. Their testimony in sub-
stance As that the knowledge of right and wrong was
inot the test to determine his responsibility.
The medical testimony was so strong that the
court stopped the trial, substantially directing the-
jury to acquit defendant, but Chief Justice Tinidal in-
structad the jury that the knowledge was th? test, fol-
lowin g the old rule. This decision was referred to the
House of Lords, by which it was subsequently sustained.
The pritciples established by this decision have re-
maifned the law of England until the present day and
have been adopted in many of the states.
The propositions are the followin- in substance:
1st:- The jury ought to be told in every case
that every man is presumed to be sane, and to possess
a sufficieit degree of reason to be responsible for
his crime, until the contrary be proven to their satis-
fac tiol.
2nd:- To establish a defense on the ground of
insanity, it must be clearly proven that at the time
of committing thu offense the party accused was labor-
iig under such a defect of r,asou caused by disease of
the mind as not to know the Uature and jiality of the
act h_- was doin- or that it was wrong.
3rd:- If the accitsed labor under a partial delu-
sion only. and is not in other respects insane, he
must be considered in the same situation as to respons-
ibility as if th3 facts in respect to which thr. delusion
e)2ists were real.
The courts of lew York State adopted the rule as
laid dowa by the iviCauhten case in the trial of Free-
man vs. People, I Denio 9, in which it is said: "That
if the prisoner knew the act was wrong at the time he
comitted it, he is responsible." The rule )s laid
down by this case has be en followed anfd it the law of
this state to-day.
In the case of Flaia an vs. State, b2 _J". Y. pa-e
467, this rule was assailed, and an attempt made to
have the court reco-7;ie the fact that the knowledge
test was not always the true one. The court said: "The
law rco-nizes no form of insanity, it is declared, in
which the capacity of distinguishing right from wron ,
without the power of choosing between them." "The vague-
,LeSS and uncertainty of this in juiry are deemed to ren-
der the doctriiie daii>j,.rous -mid ii"expedijit." 7h.!± the
Penal Code of U.ew York S tate was euacted in 1882, the
defiuition of insaiity auad the test of criminal re:spoa-
sibility when iisanity is pleaded, was not changed and
is in harmony with the definition as established by the
,cTuhten case.
The question of .hat was the true test of crimin-
al liability wheL insanity was pleaded came up in the
case of Loefles vs. State, 10 Ohio St. The court said,
"Insanity,in its general legal sense, is the inability
or incapacity to distinguish right from wron- as ap-
plied to particular cases of crimes; when the ability
to distinguish right from wrong is overcome or destroy-
ed or the knowledge of such distinction is buried in
oblivion, such a fact would make a perpetrator irres-
pousible. "
Ii, the United States the test of right and wrong
has generally been followed. In the case of U. S. vs.
v'icalue, 1 Curtis, U. S. Ct., Chief Justice Curtis in-
structed the jury "that the question for them to decide
was whether the prisoner understood the nature of the
act, and knew he was doing wrong, and if he did, he
would d: serve punishment.
In the state of hwLsas in the case of State vs.
Moury, 1 Lac. 483, the court direct,:.d the jiry as
follows: "If the defendant was laboring under such a
defect of reason from disease of the mind, as not to
know the nature or quality of the act he was doin-:, then
the law does not hold him responsible for his acts; on
the other hand, if he was capable of understanding
what ho was doing and had the power to know his act
was wrong, the law will hold him criminally responsible
for it. If this power of discrimiation enists, he
will not bw exempted from punishment because he is a
person of weak intellect or one whose mind or moral
perceptions are blunted, or because his mind may be
depressed or distracted from brooding over distract-
ions or disappointment, or because he may be wrought up
to the most intense mental eicitement from sentiments
of jealousy, anger oN revenge. The law recognizes no
form of insanity, although the mental faculties may be
destroyed or deranged, so long as the person committing
the crime knew what he was doing and that the act was
wrong. 9
It will be easily seen upon an examination of the
cases which follow the right and wrong ruls as the t-lue
one, that they are all based upori priuciples as estab-
lished in the T1Ac-auhten case, followii- old rules and
precedents, and also on the theory that to reco nize
any other test would introduce a rule daiigerous in its
effect, which would defeat the protection which the
law affords to the people against the acts of crimin-
als, and would allow many to escape punishment who in
fact deserved it, but all courts as well as medical au-
thorities have not clung to the right and wrong test as
the true one, and they have adopted a more perfect and
justice seeking rule. It is almost aedless to add)
that in the courts which only recognize the right and
wrong test, one affected by an insane delusion or ir-
resistible impulse caused by disease of the mind, is
in the same situation in regard to criminal responsi-
bility as if he was one who had the strongest mind un-
affected by disease.
Ii the state of Indiana in the case of Flake vs.
State, 23 '!. E. 273$, it was held "that a person may
have sufficient mental capacity to know right from
wrong, aid to be able to comprehend the nature ad con-
sequences of his acts, and not be criminally responsi-
ble for his acts; for if the will power is so impaired
23.
that he ca(Lnot r,_.Sist a± irresistible impulse to com-
mit crime, he is not of sou'd mi:ad."
It is also held in the same case, if the lack of
will power is the result of disease of the mifid there
is no criminal responsibility, but if the will power
is simply overcome by ungoverned passions, there is
criminal rasponsibility, citin ) Goodwin vs. State,
96 Ind. aiid Cenway vs. State, 118 Ind. This is un-
doubtedly thz law of ldiina, and it shows how the
courts of that state refused to follow the early rule
as laid down by the courts of that stats, which at first
reco-aized the right and wrongs rule as the true guide.
The capacity to disti~iuish between ri-ht ,ud
wronz' has been discarded. as the true test ii all cases
in the state of Iowa, and it has been held that if a
person conunitted a homocide knowin- it was wron-, but
did so under the influence of an ucontrollable and ir-
resistible impulse, arising not from natural passion
but from an insane condition of the mind, he is not
crimiiially rlsponsible. In the case of State vs. Tel-
,ter, 2e Iowa 68, Judge Dillion said, "If by the obser-
vation and conmcrrent testimony of medical men who
make the study of inYsanity a specialty, it should ce
definitely established to be true that thore is nu,,
ulisould co-dition of the mind, that is a diseased con-
ditioi of the mind in which, though a person knows that
-a ziven act is wron-, he is yet by an insane impulse,
that is an impulse proceeding from disense of the mind,
irresistibly driven to commit it, the law must modify
its aacient doctrine and recognise the truth aJid give
to this condition, when it is satisfactorily shown to
exist, its exculpation.
A very late anid ifistrutctive case on the subject
of insanity is the case of State vs. Reidell, 14 Alt.
Rep. 532, a case decided in Dolaware, in which Judge
Comegys said, "It seems at first view very uDireasol-
able to suppose that one who is capable of knowing
right from wrong should be entirely able to decide
betwenn them if he choose to do so, but it is a well
known fact that such capacity of knowledge may be per-
fect enough in an individual and yet he may be unable,
from destruction or impairment of that function of the
brain which is con'nected with the will, to avoid doing
what he knows to be wrong."
It was formerly held that the old rule was the
test in Pennsylvania, but it was overruled in the cast
of Coyle vs. Cor, 100 Pa., in which it is said, 'that
there may be ai -,unseen li meiit previion. the mind
dra,, ing it to cons- ;iences which it sees bat ca- not
avoid, a~1d placing it under the coercion which its
result is seen, but the mind is incapable of resist-
anice. "
The question of what was to be accepted as the
true test of iLisanity came up in the case of Parsons
vs. State, 2 So. Rep. A\la. The Judge laid down the fol-
lowing rules: "The capacity to distinguish between
right o Lid wroiig, whether abstractedly or as applied to
the particular act, as a. legal test of insanity and
respoitsibility for crime is repudiated by the modern
legal and medical authorities, who lay down the follow-
in- rules and which the court now adopts: (1) Where
there is no such capacity to distinguish between right
and wrong as applied to the particular act, there is no
legal responsibility. (2) Where there is such capa-
city, a defendant is nevertheless not legally respons-
ible if by reason of the du.ress of mental disease he
has so far lost the power to choose between them as not
to -avoid doing the act in question, so his fre, agency
was at the time destroyed, and at the time the alleged
crime was so connected with such mental disease in re-
lation of cause and effect as to have been the product
or offspriig of it solely." "The sni r2l applies to
delusionaal insaiity aid necessarily conflicts with the
old rule laid down by the Judges in the 14jcaughten
case, and the e.istence or non-exist. ,ce of the disease
of insanity, such as may fall within the above rules,
is a quesLion for the jury, enlightened by the testi-
mony of experts."
k very notable instance showing how the physic-
ians re-ard the old rule as a test for determining
criminal responsibility when insanity is pleaded as a
defe.se, is found in the followin, resolution passed
at the british kssociation of TK edical Officers of ksy-
lums and Kospitals for the Inasane, held July 14, 1887,
where there was 64 medical officers: "Resolved, that so
much of the legal test of mental condition of an alleged
criminal lunatic as renders him a responsible agent be-
cause he knows the differnce betweena right and wrong,
is inconsistent with the fact well known to every mem-
ber of this meeting, the power to distinguish between
right and wrong 'eists in those who are often associ-
ated with _an-erous and uacontrollable delusions."
N somewhat peculiar doctrine eiists in 7Tew Y amp-
shire: all tests of insmLity as matters of law are re-
jected, atid neither delusions, hallucinations, nor
knowledge of right and wrong affords any inflexible
test of criminal responsibility, bit all symptoms of
disease and its effects upon the faculties are submit-
ted to the jury, and the testimony of non-expert wit-
nses , is excluded.
In the case of State vs. Pike, 49 71.K. 399, Judge
Doe said, "It was for a long time supposed that men
however insane, if they knew the act was wrong could
refraini from doing it, but whether that supposition
was correct or not is a question for the jury. The
knowledge test in all its forms and the delusion test
are medical theories introduced in the immature stages
of science in the dim light of early times, and subse-
quently upon more exte a sive observations and more
critical examination, repudiated by the medical pro-
fession. "
"When the authorities of the comion law began
to deal with insanity, they adopted the prevailing med-
ical theories, and the distinction between the duty of
the court to decide questions of fact did not exist,
and was not appreciated and observed then as it now is
in this state."
Moral Inlsanity.
Uder the d(,rcisioiis of the state3, moral insanity,
as distiii-tisheJ from mental derangeriient, is no e-icUSJ
for crime, nor exemptioia from pnnishment, the refor' under
the decisions of Califorija, F-opl3 vs. K*, r'ijt, 14
Pac. 849. "It was held not error to state in a charge
as a defense of insanity that the law rejects the Joc-
trine of what is called moral insanity which begins on
the eve of the criminal act and einds when the act is
committed."
Isanity resulting from Intoxication.
UIthough drunkeness is no palliation or excuse
for crime, yet mental unsouindiess brought about by ii-
toxication may e ,cuse when the mind is destroyed by
!oig continuance of the habit of drunkeness, and wh-n
a person is insanie at the time of conritt1;i the crime,
he is not punishable although such insanity be remote-
ly caused by undue indulgence in spirituous liiuors, or
from what in a moral seise is a criminal neglect of du-
ty, for if the reason be affected or destroyed by a fin-
ed disease, although brought about by the defendant's
own vices, the law holds him not responsible, but tem-
porary ins uity resultiig from intoxicationi does not in
most states destroy responsibility or constitute a de-
fenn e to crime, but when the question is whether a muar-
der is of first or second degree, the fact of the
drunkeness may be shown to prove the mental condition
of the accused to determine whether or not the killing
resulted from a deliberate and premeditated purpose,
see Colbath vs. State JY, : 7 !,
k fixed frenzy or insanity or delirium tremens
destroys all legal responsibility, and although induced
by voluntary intoxication, is a good defense, provid-
ing the mental condition za stand the tests applied
to other forms of insanity; see Roberts vs. People, 10
Vvich. 401. It is also well settled by the law since
the time of Lord Hale, that if a person be made drunk
by fraud or stratagem of another or by the iinskilful-
ness of a physician, he is not responsible for his acts
committed while under the influence of the drugs or
liquors thus taken; see Roberts vs. State, NV
General Statement of the Law, of what Iasanity will
constitute a defenise to Criminal kcts.
The law does not re uire, as to the conldition of
criminil respoi-sibility, the possession of one' s fficul-
ties iL fitll ,igor, uiimpaired by disease or ilfirmity.
The mi-id may be weake-ed by disease or impaired, aJ.
yet the accused be criminally respolisible. He can only
discharge himself from risponsibility, in most states,
by proving that his intllect was so disordered that
he did not know the nature and 1uality of the act he
was cori1 ittin.-, d that it was ani act that he ought
not to do. li,3re irresistible impulse to commit murder
by reason of mental deraninemeat at the time of the act
is not a defense, in most states, as long as the accus-
ed knew the act he was conmitting was wrong and pun-
ish~ble by the law. ioral insanity is considered no
excuse for crime. The law rejects the doctrine of e-
motional iasanity, and thorough it is not so definite
on the subject of insane delusions, it is almost a set-
tled priaciple in a majority of the states, at least
for the present, that a del'ision caused by disease or
otherwise is no defense for a criminal act.
This seems to be the law, as derived from the
decisions revie ,Tjd, as near Ii my vocabulary will ,x-
press it, but for a closer analysis of the subjcrt aiid
for th,2 purpose of determiing whit is the la'v in each
stat,- upoli the subject, it seems to me, after a.L exam-
ination of the state and the U -ited 5 tates courts,
that three rules may be formulated, and that all the
states have followed some one of these rules for the
Jetermilatilon of crimii±al responsibility whi1- insanity
is pleaded. The rules are as follows:
i:- The ri-ht aid wrong test may be said to
ex.ist in the followinc states: Uew York, Ohio, Mlich-
igan, T"ew Jersey, Kent-acky, iinesota, Colorado, Cali-
fornia, Oregon, '(5,eor ia, South Carolina, > orth Jaroli-
na, Tennessee, Texas, ,ebraska and all the other states
not givean under either of the two followiu- rules.
Secoiid:- To the test of knowledge of righit aid
wrong is added an element of the power of the accused
to cortrol his acts and apply his sense of the moral
nature of his acts. The states which follow this rule
are the folowi ng: Pe.nnsylvania, klabama, Delaware,
>aryland, Iowa, Illi lois, Llassachusetts and !Tst Vir-
Third: - The question of the defend r.t' s respons-
ibility is left in broad general terms to the jury;
this rule is followedI iL 7.ew T'ampshire.
The question of which one of these3 rules shall be
followed, when our statute makers come to frame a uni-
\ersal ', N on the subject, seems to be whether aii old
rule of legal resposibility shall be adh -f-'to,
based on the theories of physicianis promul-ateJ a hun-
dred years aLo, which refused to recognize any insanity
which would exempt from punishment, except the single
test of mental capacity to distinziuish right froii wr'on-7,
or whether the statute makers, when they come to frame
a statute, will recognize as a possible fact, if capable
of proof by clear a Id satisfactory testimony, the doc-
trine now alle-ed by those of the medical profession
who have made insanity a special subject of inivesti--a-
tioni, that the old test is wrong and that there is no
single test by which the existence of the disease to that
de-gree which exempts from pu--ishment, can in every case
be detected. The ilLquiry must not be unduly obstructeld
by tiz doctrine of stare decisis, for the life of the
law and scientific discourses and the requirements of
an ever advancing civilization call for . change of the
knowledge test as the only aad true test.
There is inherent in a change of the knowledge
test the vital principle of judicial evolution, which
preseuts itself by a constait stri-1<gle for app'o2 ima-
tion to the highest wisdom.
U:,d2r the present state of our law, as adopted
by the states which follow the rule laid down in th_
,ci aulhten case, we are co.rfronted with the practical
difficulty which itself demonstrates the defects of the
rule. The courts in effect charge the juries, as mat-
ters of Taw, that no such mental disease exists as that
ofte testified to by physicians, superintendents of in-
sane hospitals and other experts; that there canot be
as a matter of scientific fact any defect of the mind
which destroys the person of self control or his lib-
erty of action, providing only hz. relains a i,_ntal con-
sciousness of right and wrong. The experts are irmmed-
iately put under oath aiid tell the juries just the con-
trary as matters of evidei±ce, asserting that no one of
ordinary intelligence can spend an hour in the ,ards of
an insane asylum without discovering such cases, and
in fact that the whole maniagemient of such institu: tions
presupposes a knowledge of right and wron- on the part
of their inmates. The practical result in most cases
Ls that the jijJ-es char-e one way a i; the jury follow
an alleed hi ahw lx' of humanlity arid find in harmony
with th-3 evidenace, but we hope for a better state of
affairs soon upoi. -til these poiints, in which the law,
from its universality, laJks humanity, and ii. no depart-
mrit of' our law, to my knowledge, does the law work
so reat iLijustice in most states as it does in that
of insanity as a defense to criminal acts.
Evidence.
As the conclusions of the jury relative to the
existence of insanity must necessarily be founded oli
the testimony offered by the parties, it is the subject
of the utmost importaiice by whom this testimony shall
be given, and the amount of evidence which will justi-
fy an acuittal. If the decisions of this point were
purely matters of facts, the only duty of the jury
would be to see that they were sufficient for the pur-
pose and proceed upoa authentic sourc,.s; but on the
contrary, it is a matter of -nfernacp to be drawn from
a certain data, and this is a duty for which our juries,
as at present constituted, are unfit. "That a body of
men taken from the common walks of lifu should be re-
quired to decide whether or not certain opinions and
facts in evidence prove derangement of mind, or, in
other words, to decide a professional question of a
very delicate nature and involving some of the high-
est interests of men, is an idea so preposterous that
one finds it difficult at first sitht to believe that
it was ever seriously entertained." But such is the
law as imposed upon us by custom, and we must make the
best of it. We must know the rules of evidence to be
aaywhere near perfect.
Burden of Proof.
The question of the sufficiency of the proof of
insanity which must be adduced, and as to the effect
it must produce upon the jury in order to justify a
verdict of acquittal, is no nearer settled than the
question of what ins_nity will excuse for crime. The
courts seem to all agree on this proposition: That
the state must prove all the facts necessary to con-
stitute the crime, among which is the fact that the
defendant was of sane mind when he comitted the crime,
but here is where the law steps in aud helps the state
by th3 legal presi:imptioa that every man is saie until
the -'ontrary is shown by either siJe, and if there is
no evideice given to prove isa-ity, the le rd!pre-
sumption is sufficient to carry a couviction, but upon
the uestion of how much evidence is required to re-
move this !e<al presumption is where the diversity of
opinion exists, and this difference of opinion illus-
trates how -rea't minids differ, wheni,havini the same
pre mises from which to reaso, they arrive at contrary
Co ac lus i ons.
The adjudications upoii this juestioi may be prop-
erly brought under some one of the followin- rules, as
deduced from the decisions of the courts of the United
States.
ist. It has b en held that insanity is a simple
question of fact to be poven like any other fact, and
any evidence which reasonably satisfies the jury that
the a-cusesl was insane at the time of committing the
act, should be deemed sufficient for an aciittal.
In the case of State vs. Reid3ll, 14- lt. aeo,
the judg-e said, "The law holds every man against whom
there is proof of the commission of a crime to have
been of sane mind when he did it. This presumption,
however, may be overcome by proof providing it be sat-
isfactory to thz jury.
I;, the case of' (iter vs. E tate (Alabama) 3 So. 300
it was held, "that iris ,ilty must b,2 established3 by
a preponderance of exidence a.1d that a reasonable
doubt does not authorize -n acquittal; and this applies
both to the fact of insanity aid th conection be-
tween it and th;3 crime.
This rule is followed ii the followiii' states:
Alabama, Delaware, Teias, 1-enisylvania, Ohio, Iowa,
krkazusas acid Kansas.
2nd. It has been held that where a person is
accused of the commission of a crime and pleads that
he was inisane at the time of the commission of the
crime, evidence of sufficient wei.'ht to raise in the
minids of the jury a r )aonable doubt of defendant's
sanity at the time the act was committed entitled
him to an ac nuittal. This rule was early laid down i,.
the cast of McCann vs. People, 16 7. Y., in which
Judge Pr'own said, "That while the law presumed every
man to c, sane, blit t1 1a 1 hein the prisoner introduced
pr.:of to show his irsanity, the burden of proof devolved
upo the people to prove his sanity,like any other
matter of fact, heyond -a reasonable doubt, and the pris-
oner is entitled to the benefit of any doubt restin.
upon the uestion of. his sanity, s-a~ity is a necessaLry
condition to constitut the cilme, -nd when the pre-
sumption of sanity has beei i-',moved. by eviden-e show-
in- insanity, the prosecution must prove the sanity
beyond a reasonable doubt in order to secure a coavic-
tioii." This decision was not followed by the subse-
uent court of New York State, a.id there was much con-
flAsion in the decisions for many years, until at last
the courts have settled the law in this state as fol-
lows: Every man is presumed sane. If any evide ice
is given by either party teadin- to show the prisoner
i isa-ie at the time of the copnmmittin-, of the offense al-
1e7ed, then the b.;rden of proof is upon the prosecu-
tion and there remains until the end of the trial, and
in order to secure a conviction, the prosecutor must
prove the sanity of the defendant at the time of the
alleged offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and if the
jury have a. reasonable doubt of the sanity of the pris-
oner at the time of the cormmitting of the act, they
must -rive him the be.:-iefit of it aid acquit, ajd it may
be further added: that if the jury are fairly acid plain-
ly instructed that a reasonable doubt in their rninds
upon the question of insanity entitles the prisoner to
a-1 acquittal, aid that is all that is necessary to em-
body in the charge, and any nice distinctions as to
the burden of proof and affirmative of issue are un-
iecessary and immaterial; see
People vs. Walker, 88 TI. Y. 81.
O'Coninell vs. People, 87 I. Y. 377.
In the case of Chase vs. People, 40 Illinois 302,
the jid-e said that "If insanity is relied upon, and
any evidence is -iven to establish that unfortunate
condition of the mind, and a reasonable well founded
doubt is thereby created of the sanity of the accused,
every principle of jlistice and humanity demand the ac-
cused shall have the beniefit of it. We do not desire to
be understood as holding the prosecution to the proof
of sanity in any case, but we do hold, where evidence
of insanity has been introduced by the accused and a
reasonable doubt of his saaity is thereby created, the
accused cannot be convicted of the crime Charged."
This rule has been adopted in the followinT
states: Te.nessee, 1,1ew York, New Hampshire, NTevada,
Mississippi, Indiana and Illinois.
3rd. It has been held that insomuch as the pre-
sumption of i:-nocence attends the defendant on trial and
the presumption of sanity likewise attenads the case
of the state, the same amount of evideice is requisite
to remove one presumption as the other. kad since the
state must establish the guailt of the teyond
a reasonable doubt, so the defendant, when he pleads
itstanity for his defense, must establish it oeyonid a rea-
sonable doubt.
There were only two states which ever adopted
this rule by judicial decisions; they were )(ew Jersey
and Delaware, butt Delaware has since refused to follow
it and tow follows the first rule as -iven in this
article. It seems that by statute Oregon has also ad-
opted this rule, and it is provided in the statute that
when insanity is pleaded, that th, defendant must prove
his iisanity beyond a reasonable doubt in order to se-
cure an acquittal.
It will easily be seen upon an examiatio' of
the cases oin insanity, and especially those upon the
question of the burden of proof, that there is contin-
ually appeari, i before us the term reasonable doubt,
and perhaps it would not be out of place to -ive the
meaiis of the term as it seems to be used in the de-
cisions of the courts. The term reasonable doubt does
ot mea, every vague or conjectural doubt; but a sub-
stalitial doubt arisin- from the evidence or lack of ev-
ideace inconsistent with the theory of the defendant's
_uilt. The jud-e should accurately e<plain the term to
the jury in each case, and a charge: "that the jury
should be convinced as jurors when they would be con-
vinced as ,yie-n, and doubt as jurors when they should
doubt as men."has been held to be correct char-e in
criminal cases where insanity was pleaded as a defense.
In the case of Spies vs. People, 112 Illinois,
the court defined a reasonable doubt to be such a doubt
as,if it were interposed in the graver transactions of
life, it would cause a reasonable man to hesitate and
pause. If it is such a doubt it is sufficieit to au-
thorize a verdict of not guilty. If after a consider-
ation of all the evidence you can say you have an abid-
in- conavictioi of the truth of the charge, you are sat-
isfied 4yj a reasonable doubt. The rule of what is a
reasonable doubt, as thus formulated, has been approved
by the courts of the United States.
Under the head of Evidence - What is Admissible.
All expert testimony is admissible and competent
because it is by such testimony that the enisteice of
the disease of insanity ca, be established, but the val-
ue of such testimony ought to depend mainly upon the
experience, fidelity and impartiality of the witness who
gives it, its desicff bein.j to aid the judgment of the
triers of the case in re'ard to the effect and influ-
ence of certain facts which lie out of the observation,
knowledge and experience of persons in general, but no
jury ought to give more weight to expert opinions in
deciding the case than, oi the whole testimony, they
thi.ik such opinions fairly merit. It is the duuy of the
court to decide who are really experts withini the mean-
ing of the law before their evidence is -iven, so as
to be entitled to the weight of expert testimony. When
the evidence is conflicting, both as to the facts and
thei opinions of medical experts, as to the prisoner's
mania, a physicianri ca.inot be asked his opinion of the
actual case shown by the evideace, since that would
tend to usurp the function of the jury; see State vs.
&unter, 3 So. 600. When the question of whether the
defendant has recovered from an attack of insanity aad
had been confined in an insane asylum, the superinteuid-
e .t of the asylum may be allowed to testify for either
side. In some states the court requires that the ex-
perts state the facts upon which they base their opin-
ions, or are given a hypothetical case and their opin-
ions required, but this rule is not followed in all the
states, and in the cawe of State vs. Pritchet, ii S. E.
3657, a physicia:i who had known the defendant well for
a loui2 time and had frequent conversations with him,
was allowed to give his opinions as an expert, as to the
sanity, though his opinion was not based oa the evidence
adjuced on the trial, or on a hypothetical case.
lot only is expert testimony allowed, but in
most states non-experts are allowed to testify, but
they are never allowed to give their opinions based
upon a hypothetical case, and as a -.eaeral rule they
are required to state the facts upon which they base
their opinions, to the jury, thus givinT the jury the
chatice to judge of the correctness of their conclu-
sions, but in some states it has been held that non-
experts, who have had the opportunity to observe the
facts, and did in fact observe them, may state their
opiinion of the defendant' s sanity without giving any
facts upon which their opinion is based.
e'ere stands the law of insanity so far as given
in this production as it is, and there is plenty more
of it: in fact our digests bristle with cases on the
subject. It is a very prevalent defense to criminal
acts because of its prevalency as a disease. Don't un-
derstand me to say that the fact of insanity being en-
tered as a plea is very c'±clusive evidence of its
existeice, but it is certainly evideit that the de-
mands of the age call for a more competent method of
investigatin- into the vagaries of this malady.
,aenerally speaking life is as sweet to one man
as to another. A man who takes the life of a fel-
low maii has either a dark malevolent disposition, or
some certain disease of the mind over which he has no
control. The former all nature cries out a-ainst. Fe
is a man to be shunned, a man to be exterminated. The
inane man asks in words more pitying thau mouth can
utter, that he should not be punished for deeds done
but entirely foreign to his volition, as they are to
the volition of the human race. Wlhy men, because of
weakness of minid, should be exempt from civil respons-
ibility, and liable for acts over which they have no
control, is a problem too deep for human reason6
Metaphysics, in its present condition, is utter-
ly incompetent to fuLiriish a satisfactory explanation
of the phenomona of insanity, and a more deplurable
waste of ingermity can hardly be imagined than is wit-
nessed in the modern attempt to reconcile the facts
of the oie with the other.
As a suggestion iin coiiclusion, let me s'.y, that
the popular mind is e-itirely uiifitteJd for a careful
and impartial itivestigatiou of the plea of insanity,
aad that the meiTital coudition of the accused should
be examined into by men, who have become fitted for
such duties by a peculiar course of study and exper-
ience. The court is not the man, because his train-
in- and all his experience has laid down one rule for
him: "Few to the line." Fe knows but one word - prece.
dent. The jury of ordiniary men,as now chosen, is in-
competent because of feelings of vengea:ace excited by
the bloody deeds of the accused. Let us have for the
protection of the accused insane the universal adop-
tion of the statute proposed in this article, with the
adlition of medical experts as a court for this branich
of ou~r jurisprudence.

